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BERNSTEIN, CHADHA, AND MONTJOY factors causing such cross-state measurement bias in these CPS estimates were confounded with other state-level characteristics, researchers could not tell whether policy, process, or structural differences among states were affecting actual registration and voting or merely what is reported in surveys.
In this article, we investigate the state-to-state variation in voting overreporting in the CPS from 1 980-2000. ' First, we demonstrate that the rates of overreporting vary widely across the states and that this variation has a fairly stable pattern. That is, states with high rates of overreporting in one year tend to have high rates in other years, while those with low rates tend to stay low. Second, we examine the causes of this cross-state bias in overreporting. We look at data from the 1980s to test causal hypotheses that we developed recently at the individual level (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001 ) . The 1980s are the last years for which individual-level data is available for such comparisons between the two levels. Because this aggregate-data analysis confirms our model of individual-level behavior, it gives us greater confidence in the validity of our aggregate-level findings.
Third, we test how well this model explains statewide overreporting in the last two presidential election years -1996 and 2000. In those years, both reported and actual voting can be measured as the percentage of voting-age citizens, rather than only as the percentage of voting-age population. We assume that any changes in the overreporting process since the 1980s that are observed at the state level would reflect changes in the process at the individual level, a level for which there are no data. If no changes in the process are found at the state level, the processes identified in the 1980s data at the individual level probably still hold. Scholars must now rely on such inferences from the state level to the individual level, since the American National Election Studies (NES), the only national surveys that actually measured respondents' voting behavior objectively, stopped its validation efforts a decade ago.
Finally, we demonstrate why this bias matters to those studying voting behavior. First, we devise a method for deflating reported statewide voting registration figures, assuming that they are inflated in the same way as are statewide voting figures. Then we substitute these adjusted rates for the reported rates in 1980 and 1984 in a replication of Brown, Jackson, and Wright's (1999) analysis of the influences on registration rates. Our analysis shows that using these adjusted rates can improve explanation. This is the first study to document that there is a significant and stable cross-state bias in survey overreporting of voting and registration. It is the first to show that this bias in the CPS data can weaken explanations and distort findings. And it is the first to suggest a method for adjusting CPS-reported statewide registration figures to account for this bias.
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A STATEWIDE MEASURE OF VOTING AND REGISTRATION OVERREPORTING
In even-numbered years, the CPS surveys over 100,000 non-institutional residents of the United States about their voting behavior. Since 1980, this survey has included aggregate estimates of voter registration and voting for each state. While there is no objective validation of individual responses, we can compare those survey-reported turnout rates for each state with officially reported, or "actual," 2 turnout rates to estimate statewide overreporting of voting.
From 1980 to 1992, the CPS reported voting rates as the percentage of the voting-age respondents who reported voting. A problem with using voting-age respondents in the denominator of this ratio is that not all votingage respondents are eligible to vote. To help address this problem, since 1994, the CPS also reported the more meaningful voting rate -the percentage of respondents who were voting-age citizens who reported voting. To allow for comparisons with the reported rates for 1980-92 (where the denominator was voting-age respondents), actual voting rates can be computed by dividing the actual number voting by the voting-age population ( VAP) in a state. For 1996 and 2000 (where the survey-reported rate is based on citizens), the comparable actual voting rate can be computed by dividing the actual number voting by the number of voting-age citizens. 3
Regardless of year, we divide the differences between the survey-reported and actual voting rates by the percentage who did not vote to obtain the percentage of nonvoters who overreported.4 We computed this percentage overreporting for each state in the presidential years from 1980 to 2000.
THE PATTERN OF VOTING OVERREPORTING AT THE STATE LEVEL
Our estimated overreporting rates varied tremendously among the states each year in our dataset. Over the six elections, mean overreporting ranged from 9 percent to 16 percent, with a standard deviation of at least 5 percent. Each year, the rate of overreporting in each of the highest five states was more than twice that in any of the lowest five. At least one state each year saw overreporting above 30 percent, while another saw a rate below 4 percent. Indeed, in both 1984 and 2000, at least one state had a survey-reported voting rate lower than the actual voting rate, while another state had a reported rate that exceeded the actual rate by more than 35 percent.
Of greater importance, this variation in the rate of overreporting was not random. States with high rates of overreporting for one year tended to have high rates every year; those with low rates tended to have low rates every year. Table 1 shows the interyear bivariate correlations of overreporting rates. All are positive and statistically significant. The correlations between adjacent years tend to be higher than those between years farther apart, but the general pattern is sufficiently strong that overreporting rates in 1980 correlate at .38 with those in 2000. sociations are strong enough at the individual level and the independent variables are not too badly skewed, associations at the aggregate level are likely to be analogous to those at the individual level.7 Our analysis of NES data from the 1980s demonstrates that "the key to understanding why people overreport is that those who are under the most pressure to vote are the ones most likely to misrepresent their behavior when they fail to do so" (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001, 41 ) . In testing hypotheses derived from this proposition, we show that among nonvoters in our dataset, higher probabilities of overreporting were a function of a person:
VOTING OVERREPORTING IN THE I98OS
• Living in a district with a greater concentration of racial and ethnic minority voters, • Attending church more frequently, • Having a higher level of education, and • Among white nonvoters only, residing in the Deep South.8
MINORITY CONCENTRATION
Members of racial and ethnic minority groups come under increasing pressure to vote as their numbers increase in an area, because this increases the probability that churches, community organizations, and political mobilizers will contact them directly with appeals to vote based on loyalty to the racial or ethnic group (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Carton 1984; Hritzuk and Park 2000) . Whites also can be more likely to vote as the concentration of minorities increases, because higher concentrations of minorities are seen as threatening to white interests and are associated with greater levels of intolerance and support for racist candidates (Giles and Evans 1985; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Giles and Buckner 1993; Wright 1977; Stanley 1987) .
Because the pressures to vote increase as the concentration of minorities increases, those who live in areas with high concentrations of minorities and fail to vote (whether they themselves are members of a minority group or not) tend to feel greater guilt, and, therefore, they are less likely to admit to interviewers their failure to vote. In separate analyses, we found (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001, 33 ) that overreporting by African Americans increased with increasing concentrations of African Americans, overreporting by Latinos increased with increasing concentrations of Latinos, and overreporting by white Anglos increased with increasing concentrations of either African Americans or Latinos.9
Religiosity
People who attend church regularly are under greater pressure than others to vote because they are likely to be told from the pulpit that they have a sacred obligation to do so (Macaluso and Wanat 1979; Wald 1997, 38; Menendez 1996) . When they do not fulfill this obligation, these religious people are especially likely to feel guilty and, thus, fail to confess their nonvoting to surveyors. We found that frequent attenders of religious services were up to twice as likely to over report voting, as were those who did not attend services (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001, 350) . Education Silver, Anderson, and Abramson (1986) argue that more highly educated people are both under more pressure to vote and more pressure to appear to conform to the norm of voting than are the less educated. We confirmed that hypothesis, finding that college-educated nonvoters were about one-anda-half times more likely to overreport voting than those who were less well educated (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001, 35) .
Whites in the Deep South
Whites in the Deep South are under greater pressure to vote than elsewhere. Statewide racial appeals to whites, a history of bloody civil rights demonstrations and federal intervention to implement the Voting Rights Act, and appeals to vote from white evangelical religious leaders all bring pressure to bear on whites in the Deep South to vote that are not felt as strongly by whites elsewhere (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Himelstein 1983; Black 1976; Menendez 1996) .
10 Those who fail to vote despite these pressures are also less likely to acknowledge their failure. We found that whites in the Deep South were at least one-and-a-half times more likely to overreport voting than whites living elsewhere (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001, 35) . In contrast, African Americans living in the Deep South were no more likely to overreport voting than those living elsewhere.
REPLICATING THE INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS, I98O-88
In this section, we test to see whether statewide overreporting rates are also explained by variation in minority concentration, religiosity, education, and region, for the same years in the 1980s that we conducted our individual-level analysis (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001) . To do so, we measured counterparts of each of the individual-level independent variables at the state level. The concentration of minorities is measured by summing the percentages of African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and Asian Americans in each state (Barone and Ujifusa 1980-2002; Stanley and Niemi 1980-2002; World Almanac 1 980-2002 ) .u Religiosity is measured by the percentage of a stated population claiming to be a member of an organized religion (Quinn, et al. 1982; Bradley, et al., 1992; Glenmary Research Center 2002) . Education is measured by the percentage of those over 25 years old in a state holding a college degree (United States Census Bureau 1980 -2002 . Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina are defined as the Deep South (Matthews and Prothro 1966; Bass and DeVries 1976; Black and Black 1987; Scher 1997) .12 We start with a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, modeling state-level overreporting (Table 2 ) as a function of each of these independent variables. The results of this analysis (Table 3) show that minority concentration, religious membership, and region had effects at the state level that paralleled those at the individual level for the same time period. Voting overreporting is positively related to concentrations of racial and ethnic minorities, religious membership, and the Deep South. Education is also positively associated with overreporting, but much more weakly than at the individual level.13 The regression coefficient for each of these variables (except education) is statistically significant, and together, the variables account for 37 percent of the state-to-state variance in overreporting. The unstandardized regression coefficients show that an increase of 1.0 percent in racial and ethnic minorities in a state is estimated to add .08 points to the percentage of nonvoters who report voting. An increase of 1.0 percent in those claiming religious membership in a state is estimated to add .19 points to the percent overreporting. And, even controlling for their high concentrations of minorities and high religious membership, states in the Deep South had overreporting rates an average of 4.7 percentage points higher than those in the rest of the nation. This result is consistent with the individual-level finding of very high rates of overreporting among whites in the Deep South.
The standardized regression coefficients from this analysis show that religious membership had a greater impact on statewide voting overreporting in the 1980s than did either minority concentration or region. A one-standard deviation change in minority concentration or region is associated with a difference of about one quarter of a standard deviation in overreporting; the same change in religious membership is associated with a difference of almost one half of a standard deviation in overreporting. In summary, there was tremendous state-to-state variation in the rates at which people overreported voting in the 1980s. The pattern of this variation was fairly stable, with high year-to-year correlations in statewide overreporting rates. Statistically significant influences on that pattern were racial and ethnic minority concentration, religious membership rate, and region. These associations between the statewide overreporting rates and its influences closely parallel our findings at the individual level for the same period (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001) .
ANALYZING OVERREPORTING, I996 AND 2000
In this section, we turn to the last two presidential elections, 1996 and 2000, where we are able to restrict our analysis to voting overreporting among citizens. Paralleling our earlier analysis, we begin by showing that there was great state-to-state variation in rates of overreporting in these elections, and then we investigate the extent to which our model of the influences on overreporting holds for the most recent elections. Table 4 lists the average rate of voting overreporting by state in those two elections. There is tremendous variation among the states, from Connecticut, where the percentage reporting that they voted was lower than the percentage who actually voted, to the District of Columbia, where the percentage reporting voting was 35 percentage points higher than the percentage who actually voted. The rate in each of the top five overreporting states was at least seven times what it was in each of the bottom five. Four of the five Deep South states were among the top seven in overreporting, and the fifth ranked seventeenth. The OLS regression results testing our model of the influences on statewide overreporting with these newest data are displayed in Table 5 . Even though this analysis was done on data more than a decade later and from citizens only, rather than the whole population, the results are nearly identical to the analysis of the 1980s data: statewide rates of overreporting varied directly with minority concentration, religious membership, and the Deep South. Again, education had very little impact. Furthermore, the coefficients for minority concentration, religious membership, and Deep South are not only positive and statistically significant in both the 1980s and 1996-2000, but the unstandardized coefficients for these variables are all within a single standard error of their respective coefficients in the other time period.14 The standardized coefficients show that religious membership had the strongest impact on the overreporting rate in each time period, although its margin over the other variables is not as large in the 1996-2000 analysis as it was in the 1980s analysis. The relative impact of minority concentration increased the most in the later period, and the relative impact of region slipped slightly. Overall, these results are strong confirmation of the generalizability of this model and the hypotheses used to develop it. The very close correspondence between these two analyses confirms that we have isolated three critical factors determining statewide voting overreporting rates in the CPS. And since the findings from the 1980s statewide data closely parallel the findings at the individual level for that period, it is likely that our 1996-2000 findings also reflect contemporary individual-level behavior. As a result, researchers working at the individual level should be concerned that church members, those living in the Deep South, and those living in areas with high concentrations of racial and ethnic minorities continue to be particularly likely to overreport voting.
THE IMPACT OF OVERREPORTING BIAS IN STATEWIDE DATA
Our findings have important implications for scholars of voting behavior using the CPS data and other major voter surveys. As practices for maintain-ing voter registration lists vary substantially from state to state, there are no accurate 50-state reports of voter registration. Hence, researchers investigating the causes and effects of statewide registration rates have generally had to rely on the CPS estimates of this variable (Franklin and Grier 1997; Brown, Jackson, and Wright 1999) . If those estimates were unbiased, that is, if they were inflated by roughly the same amount in each state or inflated by unequal, but randomly distributed, amounts, then using them in analyses would do little to distort analyses. However, as we have shown, CPS estimates are substantially and consistently inflated by far more in some states than in others. That kind of measurement bias is likely 1 ) to reduce the variance that might otherwise be explained by fairly strong determinants of registration rates, and 2) to distort estimates of associations between some variables and registration rates.
In particular, models explaining levels of voter registration will be affected by this bias. Systematic errors in overreporting will lead to the underestimation of the explanatory power of voter registration models whenever the independent variables in those model are more strongly determinative of the actual registration rates than the reported rates. But an even greater danger is the biases in the estimated effects on registration of variables that cause, or are closely related to causes of, the systematic errors in measuring registration rates. Because minority concentration, religious membership, and being in the Deep South are positively related to voting overreporting, states with high values on those variables (or on other variables positively correlated with those variables) are likely to appear to have higher registration rates than they actually do. For example, people in states with large concentrations of minorities overreport voting more frequently than those in other states. If these states are also more likely than other states to enact a certain policy or have a particular party structure, it may appear that that policy or structure increases registration when, in fact, this relationship is spurious.
To minimize such biases and underestimations of causal effects, we propose that researchers deflate CPS estimates of state registration to adjust for probable differences in overreporting. Assuming that overreporting in statewide registration is best estimated from overreporting in statewide voter turnout, we use the following formula to compute estimated actual registration rates (A) from CPS-reported registration rates (R) and computed rates of overreporting among nonvoters (O): A = (R-O)/(100-O). Thus, if the CPS-reported registration rate for a state is 60 percent and the voting overreporting rate is computed to be 20 percent, the estimated actual registration rate would be (60-20)/(100-20) = .50, or 50 percent. (As a check, you can see that this is equivalent to assuming that 20 percent of the 50 percent who did not register claimed that they did.) Given that registration and voting information are gathered in the same survey, it seems wiser to assume that registration reporting is inflated at the same rate as voting reporting than to assume either that it is not inflated at all or that it is inflated by the same amount in each state.
To show how replacing reported registration rates with estimated actual rates can affect an analysis, we replicate and extend a small part of Brown, Jackson, and Wright's (1999) voter registration turnout study.15 Table 6 shows the average CPS-reported registration rates used by them for the 1984 and 1988 elections and the average estimated actual rates for the same years. The differences between these rates ranged from 1.5 percent in Vermont and Maine to 7.5 percent in Louisiana. The largest differences were in the Deep South, with CPS-reported rates in each of those five states being estimated to be inflated by at least 6 percent.
The first column of Table 7 contains the findings of Brown, Jackson, and Wright (1999, 469) as reported in the first column of their first table. The dependent variable is statewide registration rates. The second column replaces their CPS-reported registration rates for each year with our estimated actual rates for that same year. Each of the statistically significant coefficients is slightly larger when the bias-adjusted measure of statewide registration is used, and the model explains 37 percent of the variance in registration rates, up from 26 percent when using the CPS-reported rates. This is the expected result when a less accurate measure of the dependent variable is replaced with a more accurate one in a relatively good model. However, note that the use of the biased CPS-reported data in this analysis did not alter any substantive conclusion that one would have reached using the estimated actual rates. This is because the independent variables in the Brown, Jackson, and Wright model are not strongly correlated with the systematic error that overreporting introduced into the dependent variable.
When we extend the model to include independent variables that we know are strong determinants of voting overreporting, we see quite a different picture. Not only is the explanatory power of the model weaker when the biased CPS-reported registration data are used, the substantive conclusions are also distorted. The results in the third column of Table 7 are from a model using CPS-reported rates as the dependent variable and the explanatory variables from the original model, except that Deep South replaces South and minority concentration and religious membership are added. The expanded model accounts for 35 percent of the variance, and among the conclusions suggested by the model are two we want to focus on: 1) states in the Deep South have significantly higher registration rates than do other states, and 2) minority concentration has no statistically significant effect on registration. The model in the last column in Table 7 replaces the CPS-reported registration rates with the estimated actual rates. This model accounts for 44 percent of the variance, and two opposite substantive conclusions are suggested: 1 ) states in the Deep South do not have significantly higher registration rates than states elsewhere, and 2) minority concentration depresses registration rates to a statistically significant degree. Thus, using the less accurate CPS-reported data once again reduces the explanatory power of the model. But more importantly, it leads to what are probably less accurate conclusions. Because people in the Deep South and in states with high concentrations of racial and ethnic minorities overreport voter registration more frequently than do people elsewhere, using CPS-reported data increases the likelihood that researchers will conclude (incorrectly) that the actual registration rates are higher in those states than in the rest of the country. As it turns out, using CPS-reported data in this model biases coefficients for both the Deep South and minority concentration by enough to be misleading. The positive coefficient for Deep South is biased upwards by enough to make it appear statistically significant, while the negative coefficient for minority concentration is raised by enough to make it lose its statistical significance.
CONCLUSION
The statewide voter turnout and registration figures reported in the CPS are biased. The amount by which these figures are overstated varies directly with minority concentration, religious membership, and being in the Deep South. Therefore, correlations between any of these three variables and CPS-reported measures of statewide voter turnout or registration will be biased upwards. We suggest a simple method of producing more accurate measures of voter registration by deflating the CPS-reported figures using an estimate of statewide voting overreporting. Using CPS-reported voter registration rates without deflating them for overreporting is likely to reduce explanatory power and may lead to inaccurate conclusions. ENDNOTES 1. There are reasonably accurate statewide measures of voting to which we can compare the CPS data (McDonald 2002b) ; there are no similar measures of registration. For example, some state voter registration reports are so inaccurate that they show over 100 percent of the voting-age population to be registered.
2. This officially reported "actual" voter turnout rate does not take into account such factors as undercounting votes and including felons and other people ineligible to vote among either the voting-age population or voting-age citizens used in turnout calculations. These ineligible voters are the greatest threat to the validity of this measure, but since they are also included in the CPS samples, they should affect the survey-reported and actual turnout rate estimates in the same way. (Felons could be excluded in calculating actual, but not CPS-reported turnout, so they are excluded from neither in our analysis.) We proceed on the assumption that overreporting is a significant factor in the CPS overestimate and that other factors that may contribute to the overestimate are not so strong or systematic as to bias measures of turnout substantially. To facilitate our state-to-state comparisons, the actual number voting is defined as the number voting for president.
Some, but not all, states report a total number voting that is higher than the number voting for president. Using the higher number could yield a slightly more accurate estimate of overreporting for those states, but then the rates could not be compared across all states. This is because in some states, overreporting would be the difference between CPS-reported turnout and the turnout for president, while in others, it would be the difference between CPS-reported turnout and total turnout.
3. McDonald (2002b) reports the number of citizens of voting age for each state. For a discussion ofthat work, see McDonald (2002a) and McDonald and Popkin (2001) .
4. Following Silver, Anderson, and Abramson (1986) , we estimate the percentage of nonvoters, not the percentage of the electorate, who overreport because only nonvoters can overreport.
5. Using averages left us with samples of 51 cases (including Washington, DC) for each of the analyses that follow. We repeated our analyses entering each state election separately, thereby doubling or tripling the sample size (not shown). Counting each state election separately substantially increases the variance in the dependent variables in our regression models (Tables 3, 5 , and 7), but it leaves the variance in the independent variables little changed because overreporting is the least temporally stable. Comparing the state election and averaged regressions reveals: 1) the unstandardized regression coefficients are virtually identical; 2) the coefficients from the analyses with the larger samples have larger t-values and are statistically significant at more extreme levels, but no substantive conclusions change, as no coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level in one analysis and not in the other; 3) the standardized coefficients are lower in the analyses with the larger samples; and 4) the adjusted R2 is lower in the larger-sample analyses. We chose to report the results using the averages across the three elections because we expect that the state-election data are likely to over-and underestimate overreporting more than will the cross-election averages. Furthermore, data from the different state elections are not independent observations, as some variables (e.g., Deep South) do not change at all and others change only slightly and incrementally (e.g., religious membership, racial and ethnic minority concentration, and education) between elections in a state.
6. Scholars of Southern politics have long noted the differences between the Deep South and the Rim South (Matthews and Prothro 1966; Cosman 1966; Bass and DeVries 1976; Lamis 1984; Black and Black 1987; Swansbrough and Brodsky 1988; Moreland and Steed 1996; Scher 1997; Hadley and Bowman 1998; Bullock and Rozell 1998; Feigert and Todd 1998; Brodsky and Cotter 1998; Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001) .
7. Just as associations at the aggregate level need not be reflected at the individual level, associations at the individual level need not be reflected at the aggregate level. 8. Our individual-level analysis also showed that the probability of overreporting was a function of greater partisanship and contact from mobilizers, but we do not have good measures of these variables at the state level, so we cannot test these hypotheses in our aggregate-level analysis.
9. Overreporting may well increase exponentially, rather than linearly, with increases in minority concentration. However, testing the bivariate relationships between the log of concentration and the log of overreporting for both the 1980s and 1996-2000 shows that the exponent is likely to be just a little larger than 1 .0. For simplicity, we use 1 .0 here, even though the total variance explained is slightly higher if a larger exponent is used (up to and including 2.0).
10. We are not asserting or testing the "racist threat" hypothesis (Key 1949; Liu 2001 ) , that concentrations of blacks in these states prompts retaliatory white voting. We simply note that racist appeals to whites are more common in these states and that whites are subject to pressures to vote there not found as strongly elsewhere. For a more detailed presentation, see Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy (2001) . 1 1 . We were restricted in our individual-level analysis to using the percentage African American and the percentage Latino, as those were the only minority groups in the NES samples that were large enough to allow analysis (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001 ). Working at the state level in this article, we can expand our operationalization to include other minority racial and ethnic groups.
12. While we cannot determine if whites in the Deep South are overreporting at especially high rates using state-level data, we can observe whether overreporting is especially high in the Deep South states even after controlling for their concentrations of minorities and levels of religious membership.
13. The failure of education to show a statistically significant relationship with overreporting is curious, given the results at the individual level. However, the college educated are a very small percentage of nonvoters in any state. State-to-state variation in that percentage may be too small to have a significant impact on statewide overreporting rates.
14. The lower intercept for the 1996-2000 analysis is primarily a consequence of overall lower levels of voting overreporting than in the 1980s. The percentage who report voting is very slightly lower in the later period, but the percentage who actually voted is higher. This is because the rate of voting in these data is measured as the percentage of citizens, not the percentage of all voting-age people.
15. We greatly appreciate Gerald Wright's willingness to send us an SPSS file with all the data from that study so that we could do this replication and extension.
